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BOOK REVIEW
The Fall of the U.S. Consumer Electronics Industry: An American
Trade Tragedy. By Philip J. Curtis. Westport: Quorum Books, 1994.
Pp. xv, 357. Index.
Robert W. McGee*
This book tells the story of Matsushita et aL v. Zenith.' The title,
plus the fact that the author is one of the attorneys who represented
Zenith, quickly alerts the reader that the book makes no pretense
about being objective. The author does not hide the fact that he is
arguing Zenith's position, and for that he is to be commended. Lesser
authors would have wrapped their arguments in language that appears
unbiased on the surface, yet subtly supports Zenith's side of this trade
controversy. Curtis does a commendable job of presenting Zenith's
side of the story. He is a good advocate for his client's position. How-
ever, he is representing the wrong client, in this reviewer's opinion.
Curtis begins his dramatic story by relating some of Zenith's busi-
ness history. When David Sarnoff, a ruthless Russian emigr6, came to
the United States, he seized control of RCA's radio patent pool by
negotiating a consent decree separating RCA from GE and Westing-
house, its parent companies.2 He then locked up the radio manufac-
turing business all over the world and, with the help of some friends,
was able to control the industry for more than three decades by using
a scurrilous patent package-licensing scheme. Scrappy young Zenith
managed to break the cartel after an eleven-year antitrust suit, but its
victory was short-lived. Sarnoff then helped organize and license the
Japanese electronics industry and built it into a vast cartel. Within
twenty years this cartel would decimate the American radio and tele-
vision manufacturing industry.
* Professor at the W. Paul Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall University in South Or-
ange, New Jersey.
1 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
2 PLp J. CuRns, THE FALL OF THE U.S. CoNsuMER ELEcTRoNIcs INDusTRY: AN AMER-
ICAN TRADE TRAGEDY xiv (1994).
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Sarnoff is shown as a notorious industrialist who helped prepare
the Japanese for their first successful industrial market capture at-
tempt in the United States. He portrays Zenith as a valiant American
company that fought this injustice for three decades, only to lose its
fight in a 1986 Supreme Court case that was decided 5-4. Sarnoff is
shown as teaching the Japanese the tricks that they would use in the
future to capture industries by the use of predatory cartels, the
purchase of political influence and the subversion of the American
legal system. He distills his story from the unpublished evidence that
was adduced by compulsory pretrial processes in Zenith's various liti-
gation struggles.
Curtis would have us believe that an army of perfidious Washing-
ton lobbyists, including former government officials and insiders
funded by large lobbying fees were responsible for the Supreme
Court's 5-4 decision. He insists that his book is not a Japan bashing
diatribe, but merely a critical expos6 of the merchants of political in-
fluence and American legal tricksters who sold their skills to the Japa-
nese, and of the United States government officials who were used by
these tricksters to help perpetrate the fraudulent defenses to the Japa-
nese predatory dumping scheme.
Curtis spends most of the first 120 pages presenting a history of
the electronics conspiracies, the evolution of antitrust law in this area,
Zenith's challenge to the patent "racket," and the trial history. He
then presents some exhibits and a reprint of a 1979 law review article
that discusses the enforcement of the antidumping laws in the televi-
sion dumping case. He then discusses Japanese government subsidies,
for which Zenith petitions for countervailing duties on, of course. Ac-
tually, there is little actual discussion of the subsidies. More than two-
thirds of this chapter consists of exhibits of legal documents in the
case, followed by his discussion of the topic.
The next chapter he titles "The Final Battle: Matsushita et aL v.
Zenith." It looks like a showdown is coming, and the author does not
disappoint us. It all begins in 1974 when "the giant Matsushita" ac-
quires Motorola's color television business. Zenith is worried about
what the acquisition will do to Zenith's competitive position. The Jap-
anese are seen as entering into an illegal scheme to fix prices and allo-
cate markets. He discusses the conspiracy to gain control of American
television companies in some depth. He places the blame for the 5-4
decision squarely on Thurgood Marshall, whom he sees as casting the
tie-breaking vote. Marshall's opinion was simply that he could not see
why he should be concerned that American consumers get lower
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prices than Japanese consumers. He cites Marshall for aiding in ap-
proving the most rapacious and illegal attack on competition since the
robber barons. The last ninety some pages consist of legal documents
relating to the case.
If anyone is interested in seeing a detailed presentation of a trade
case, this book would be a good source. The legal documents, while
boring at times, do present a wealth of information and give the
reader a flavor for what is involved in the prosecution of such a case.
However, the reader should keep in mind that the author is presenting
only one side of the case. The author's writing style is a feature that
makes the book interesting to read. His approach - attack, really -
and his use of adjectives keeps the reader's interest.
Numerous weaknesses in Curtis' arguments could be pointed out.
I would like to play devil's advocate and discuss some of the main
ones in this review. Perhaps the major weakness in Curtis' argument
is that he falls prey to what Hazlitt,3 writing in the 1940's, and Bastiat,
4
writing before him in the 1840's, referred to as the central fallacy in
economics: looking only at the immediate consequences of an act or
proposal, or looking only at the effect a policy has on one group, while
ignoring its effects on other groups.5
For example, consider a scenario where adopting a particular pro-
tectionist policy would save 16,900 jobs, as was the case with the 1984
voluntary restraint agreement on steel.6 Someone arguing the steel
industry position would surely mention this statistic. But this statistic
tells only half of the story. The other half is that, if steel imports are
restricted, 52,400 jobs will be lost in the industries that use steel.7
Higher steel prices will cause these industries to cut corners, which
includes laying off employees and not hiring others. Thus, there were
more than three jobs destroyed for every job saved. Yet those who
look at only one side of the coin would have us believe that voluntary
restraint agreements were good for America because they saved
3 HENRY HAZL1Tr, EcoNoMIcs IN ONE LESSON (1979).
4 Bastiat did most of his writing during the 1840s. He discussed this central fallacy in several
places, including pamphlets and books. Bastiat's best exposition of this fallacy, which he called
"What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen," was written in the late 1840's and first published as a
pamphlet in July, 1850. See FREDERic BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS ON POLITCAL ECONOMY 1-
50 (1964); FREDERIC BASTIAT, OEUVRES COMPLETES DE FRkDtiuC BASTIAT (1851-79).
5 HAzLrrr, supra note 3, at 17.
6 ARTHUR T. DENzAu, How IMPORT RESTRAnTr REDUCE EMPLOYMENT (Center for the




nearly 17,000 jobs in the domestic steel industry.8 They would not
look at the other side of the coin. Thus, the picture is distorted and
incomplete. Yet this is exactly the approach that many trade protec-
tion advocates take when they put forth their arguments.
Curtis, too, looks only at one side of the controversy - his cli-
ent's side. While it is true that Zenith was harmed by the competition,
it is also true that many American consumers benefitted by being able
to buy televisions at lower prices. The money they saved by buying
cheap televisions could then be spent on other goods, thus permeating
many other domestic industries and stimulating employment. Based
on the job gain/loss ratios computed by various researchers over the
years who have estimated job gains and losses as a result of various
trade policies, it is not unreasonable to expect that two or three jobs
were created somewhere in the domestic economy for every job de-
stroyed at Zenith by Japanese competition. Yet Curtis completely ig-
nores this fact.
Another weakness - error, actually - in Curtis' thesis is that
America is deindustrializing. A look at relevant statistics reveals that
the number of industrial jobs in America has remained about constant
for the past few decades, and that American industry cranks out more
goods now than ever because of increased productivity. The size of
the pie has been increasing as more people enter the workforce, so
industry jobs have shrunk as a percentage of total jobs held because
the service sector has expanded while the number of industry jobs has
remained constant.9
Curtis's argument that the antidumping laws must be reformed in
the "public interest"'10 is a curious one. Two different criticisms can be
made of his attempt to relate antidumping reform to the public inter-
est. If one takes the Novak approach," the argument would be that in
a free society, where individuals have different values, aims and goals,
there can be no common good, since there is no common interest.
Domestic producers have an interest in halting foreign competitors
8 The results in this study were not a fluke. Other studies have also found that various
protectionist policies destroy more jobs than they save. For example, in another study, the re-
searcher estimated that implementation of a particular policy would have saved 36,000 apparel
manufacturing jobs while destroying 58,000 apparel retailing jobs. See I.M. DESTLER AND JOHN
S. ODELL , ANTI-PROTECTION: CHANGING FORCES IN UNrED STATES TRADE PoLrnCS 56, n.43
(1987).
9 RICHARD B. MCKENZIE, THE AMEmUCAN JOB MACmNE 43-67 (1988); RICHARD B. Mc-
KENZIE, COMPETING VISIONS: THE POLITICAL CONFLICT OVER AMEICA'S ECONOMIC FUTURE
33-64 (1985).
10 Curtis, supra note 2, at 230.
11 MICHAEL NOVAK, FREE PERSONS AND Ta COMMON GOOD 19-39 (1989).
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from selling their products at low prices, and consumers have an inter-
est in seeing that the practice is maintained and extended.
Even if one accepted the argument that there can be a public
interest in a pluralist society, the antidumping laws come down on the
wrong side. They protect domestic producers at the expense of the
general public. Antidumping laws are special interest legislation, not
general interest legislation. Such laws cannot be justified on utilita-
rian grounds because they do not provide the greatest good for the
greatest number. Enforcement of the antidumping laws produces
more losers than winners, thus resulting in what economists call a neg-
ative-sum game.'2
The philosophy behind the antidumping laws will not hold up to
analysis. For one thing, predatory dumping is either rare or nonexis-
tent, and even if it does exist, it benefits consumers. In effect, the
antidumping laws protect consumers from low prices. The antidump-
ing laws are special interest legislation that protect domestic produ-
cers at the expense of the general public. Antitrust economists would
find laughable Curtis' hypertension over the alleged existence of pred-
atory pricing when economists over the last few decades have been
unable to find any.
Curtis makes Matsushita out to be the bad guy. But United
States antidumping laws have perpetrated some atrocities against
Matsushita, too. For example, Matsushita decided to withdraw from
the United States' small business telephone systems market, 13 thus
abandoning more than $50 million in annual sales revenue, because of
the Commerce Department's request (on a Friday afternoon) that it
translate 3,000 pages of Japanese financial documents into English by
the following Monday morning.'4 Such Commerce Department
abuses of power and discretion should be viewed as atrocities by any
upstanding person who is interested in fair play. Yet Curtis wants to
use Commerce and Justice Department muscle to prevent a foreign
competitor from selling its products in the domestic market at prices
that American consumers are anxious to pay.
Curtis presents a good case from Zenith's point of view. His writ-
ing style is lively and holds the reader's interest. But the clarity and
amusement value of his writing style should not fool the reader into
12 For a discussion of this point, see Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping
Laws, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 491 (1993).
13 Investigation 731-TA-426, listed in I.M. DusTLER, AMERCAN TRADE POLmcs 393 (2d ed.
1992).
14 JAMES BovARD, Tnm FAr TRADE FRAuD 136 (1991).
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believing that the Zenith case was wrongly decided. While Curtis
does a good job of advocating his client's position, the economic and
legal literature screams out to tell us that Matsushita should not be
punished for giving American consumers televisions at low prices.
